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"The lesson from Libicki et al.'s 'Byting Back' is that getting not just warfighters but also governments and the public to make more and better use of technology is crucial in 'regaining information superiority' in the battle against the second of the global jihad's 'heads', the regional al-Qaeda affiliates.

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Byting BackA-Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents: RAND Counterinsurgency StudyA-Volume 1 eBook: Martin C. Libicki, David C. Gompert ...

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Byting BackA-Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents Book Description: U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed to exploit information power, which could be a U.S. advantage but instead is being used advantageously by insurgents.

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Full title: Byting back : regaining information superiority against 21st-century insurgents / Martin C. Libicki [and others] ; prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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iv Byting Back—Regaining Information Superiority Against Insurgents tion has a far higher priority than it does in conventional warfare in which the enemy is the focus. We then demonstrate what this alternate focus may imply for requirements, collection, networking, and systems design.

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Byting Back by Martin C. Libicki and David C. Gompert and David R. Frelinger available in Trade Paperback on Powells.com, also read synopsis and reviews. 'Libicki et al. argue that information collection requirements and systems for counterinsurgency are...

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In contrast, when approaching terrorists or insurgents in a more traditional battlespace, the lesson from Libicki et al.'s Byting Back is that getting not just warfighters but also governments and the public to make more and better use of technology is crucial in 'regaining information superiority' in the battle against the second of the global jihad's 'heads', the regional al-Qaeda affiliates. The fundamental point of this book, part of a larger RAND series examining counter ...

Libicki et al. argue that information collection requirements and systems for counterinsurgency are important because the community that conducts counterinsurgency crosses national and institutional boundaries and because the indigenous population plays a large role in determining the outcome of an insurgency. They then demonstrate what this focus implies for counterinsurgency requirements, collection, networking, and systems design.

U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed to exploit information power, which could be a U.S. advantage but instead is being used advantageously by insurgents. Because insurgency and counterinsurgency involve a battle for the allegiance of a population between a government and an armed opposition movement, the key to exploiting information power is to connect with and learn from the population itself, increasing the effectiveness of both the local government and the U.S. military and civilian services engaged in supporting it. Utilizing mostly available networking technology, the United States could achieve early, affordable, and substantial gains in the effectiveness of counterinsurgency by more open, integrated, and inclusive information networking with the population, local authorities, and coalition partners. The most basic information link with the population would be an information technology (IT)-enhanced, fraud-resistant registry-census. The most promising link would come from utilizing local cell phone networks, which are proliferating even among poor countries. Access to data routinely collected by such networks can form the basis for security services such as enhanced-911 and forensics. The cell phones of a well-wired citizenry can be made tantamount to sensor fields in settled areas. They can link indigenous forces with each other and with U.S. forces without interoperability problems; they can also track the responses of such forces to emergencies. Going further, outfitting weaponry with video cameras would bolster surveillance, provide lessons learned, and guard against operator misconduct. Establishing a national Wiki can help citizens describe their neighborhoods to familiarize U.S. forces with them and can promote accountable service delivery. All such information can improve counterinsurgency operations by making U.S. forces and agencies far better informed than they are at present. The authors argue that today's military and intelligence networks-being closed, compartmentalized, controlled by information providers instead of users, and limited to U.S. war fighters-hamper counterinsurgency and deprive the United States of what ought to be a strategic advantage. In contrast, based on a review of 160 requirements for counterinsurgency, the authors call for current networks to be replaced by an integrated counterinsurgency operating network (ICON) linking U.S. and indigenous operators, based on principles of inclusiveness, integration, and user preeminence. Utilizing the proposed ways of gathering information from the population, ICON would improve the timeliness, reliability, and relevance of information, while focusing security restrictions on truly sensitive information. The complexity and sensitivity of counterinsurgency call for vastly better use of IT than has been seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here is a practical plan for just that.

Armed conflict has always made serious demands on information, whether it is about the disposition of our own forces or the intentions and status of the adversarys. With the advent of modern information systems, the management of information about friend and foe has become a key determinant of how armed conflict plays out. The Department of Defense's (DoD's) information architecture for conventional warfare reflects that fact. Counterinsurgency, though, differs from conventional warfare. First, whereas the battles in conventional warfare are waged between dedicated armed forces, the battles of counterinsurgency are waged for and among the people, the central prize in counterinsurgency. Collecting information about the population is much more important than it is in conventional warfare. Second, the community that conducts counterinsurgency crosses national and institutional boundaries. institutional boundaries. U.S. and indigenous forces must work together. So, too, must military forces, security forces(notably police), and providers of other governmental services. Sharing information across these lines, thus, has a greater importance than in conventional warfare. An integrated counterinsurgency operating network (ICON) should, therefore, be different than that which DoD has built for conventional warfare. In this monograph, we outline the principles and salient features of ICON.

The battle for Gaza revealed an extremist strategy: hiding in cities and provoking attack to cause civilian deaths that can be blamed on the attacking forces. The U.S. and allied militaries, having no options but lethal force or no options at all, are ill-equipped to defeat this strategy. The use of lethal force in dense populations can harm and alienate the very people whose cooperation U.S. forces are trying to earn. To solve this problem, a new RAND study proposes a "continuum of force"--A suite of capabilities that includes sound, light, lasers, cell phones, and video cameras. In missions ranging from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping to humanitarian intervention to quelling disorder, the typical small unit of the U.S. military should and can have portable, easy-to-use, all-purpose capabilities to carry out its missions without killing or hurting civilians that may get in the way. The technologies for these capabilities are available but have not been recognized as a solution to this strategic problem and, consequently, need more high-level attention and funding.

Examines how the United States should improve its counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities through, for example, much greater focus on understanding jihadist strategy, using civil measures to strengthen the local government, and enabling local forces to conduct COIN operations. Provides a broad discussion of the investments, organizational changes, and multilateral arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.

Let's begin with the basics: violence is an inherent part of policing. The police represent the most direct means by which the state imposes its will on the citizenry. They are armed, trained, and authorized to use force. Like the possibility of arrest, the threat of violence is implicit in every police encounter. Violence, as well as the law, is what they represent. Using media reports alone, the Cato Institute's last annual study listed nearly seven thousand victims of police "misconduct" in the United States. But such stories of police brutality only scratch the surface of a national epidemic. Every year, tens of thousands are framed, blackmailed, beaten, sexually assaulted, or killed by cops. Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on civil judgments and settlements annually. Individual lives, families, and communities are destroyed. In this extensively revised and updated edition of his seminal study of policing in the United States, Kristian Williams shows that police brutality isn't an anomaly, but is built into the very meaning of law enforcement in the United States. From antebellum slave patrols to today's unarmed youth being gunned down in the streets, "peace keepers" have always used force to shape behavior, repress dissent, and defend the powerful. Our Enemies in Blue is a well-researched page-turner that both makes historical sense of this legalized social pathology and maps out possible alternatives.

"Together, the writers sound a sobering warning: the American government is an iron fist in a velvet glove whose purpose remains preserving the status quo and enriching the rich."— Publishers Weekly What happens when the techniques of counterinsurgency, developed to squash small skirmishes and guerrilla wars on the border of Empire, blend into the state's apparatus for domestic policing? In *Life During Wartime*, fifteen authors and activists reflect on the American domestic security apparatus, detailing the increasing militarization of the police force and the re-emergence of infiltration and counter-intelligence as surveillance strategies, highlighting the ways that the techniques and the technologies of counterinsurgency have been applied on the home front, and offering strategies for resistance. Includes contributions Kristian Williams, Will Munger, Walidah Imarisha, George Ciccariello-Maher, Beriah Empie, Elaine Brown, Geoffrey Boyce, Conor Cash, Vicente L. Rafael, Alexander Reid Ross, Evan Tucker, Layne Mullett, Sarah Small, and Luce Guillen-Givins.

There is a great transformation of the production of knowledge and intelligibility. The "digital fold of the world" (with the convergence of NBIC) affects the collective assemblages of "thought", of research. The aims of these assemblages are also controversial issues. From a general standpoint, these debates concern "performative science and performative society". But one emerges and strengthens that has several names: transhumanism, post-humanism, speculative post-humanism. It appears as a great narration, a large story about the future of our existence, facing our entry into the Anthropocene. It is also presented as a concrete utopia with an anthropological and technical change. In this book, we proposed to show how collective intelligences stand in the middle of the coupling of ontological horizons and of the "process of bio-technical maturation".

This book is written to be a comprehensive guide to cybersecurity and cyberwar policy and strategy, developed for a one- or two-semester class for students of public policy (including political science, law, business, etc.). Although written from a U.S. perspective, most of its contents are globally relevant. It is written essentially in four sections. The first (chapters 1 - 5) describes how compromises of computers and networks permit unauthorized parties to extract information from such systems (cyber-espionage), and/or to force these systems to misbehave in ways that disrupt their operations or corrupt their workings. The section examines notable hacks of systems, fundamental challenges to cybersecurity (e.g., the lack of forced entry, the measure-countermeasure relationship) including the role of malware, and various broad approaches to cybersecurity. The second (chapters 6 - 9) describes what government policies can, and, as importantly, cannot be expected to do to improve a nation's cybersecurity thereby leaving leave countries less susceptible to cyberattack by others. Among its focus areas are approaches to countering nation-scale attacks, the cost to victims of broad-scale cyberespionage, and how to balance intelligence and cybersecurity needs. The third (chapters 10 - 15) looks at cyberwar in the context of military operations. Describing cyberspace as the 5th domain of warfare feeds the notion that lessons learned from other domains (e.g., land, sea) apply to cyberspace. In reality, cyberwar (a campaign of disrupting/corrupting computers/networks) is quite different: it rarely breaks things, can only be useful against a sophisticated adversary, competes against cyber-espionage, and has many first-strike characteristics. The fourth (chapters 16 – 35) examines strategic cyberwar within the context of state-on-state relations. It examines what strategic cyberwar (and threats thereof) can do against whom – and how countries can respond. It then considers the possibility and limitations of a deterrence strategy to modulate such threats, covering credibility, attribution, thresholds, and punishment (as well as whether denial can deter). It continues by examining sub rosa attacks (where neither the effects nor the attacker are obvious to the public); the role of proxy cyberwar; the scope for brandishing cyberattack capabilities (including in a nuclear context); the role of narrative and signals in a conflict in cyberspace; questions of strategic stability; and norms for conduct in cyberspace (particularly in the context of Sino-U.S. relations) and the role played by international law. The last chapter considers the future of cyberwar.

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